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This thesis contains a policy analysis of the Navy's
lease versus buy decision model used in the Military
Satellite Communications (MILSATCOH) systems acquisition
process. The general issues of the lease/buy question are
considered as well as the specific quantitative methodology
used in the Navy's current model. The model is found to be
deficient in several ways. First, its basic assumption that
public sector leasing can be less costly than buying is
unfounded when total costs of the lease option to the whol e
economy are the criteria for comparison. Second, the model
fails to compare the same system output when comparing the
two financing mechanisms. The analysis of the leasing
alternative is based on the presumption that a leasing
instrument will fix all inputs at the time of contract nego-
tiation while the buy analysis presumes all inputs will
remain variable. last, the model inadequately addresses
issues such as survivability and interoperability and how,
or if, these elements of the MILSATCOfl systems decision
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I. INTHODDCTION
To lease or to buy— an important yet enigmatic guestion
when applied to today's military satellite communications
(MILSATCOM) systems. The importance of the question and the
issues concerning it center around the growing dependence of
the Department of Defense (DOD) on sophisticated, space-
based telecommunications systems for peacetime, tactical and
strategic communications. Coupled with the increasing reli-
ance on space-based systems is the magnitude of cost of such
systems. Within the current decade, MILSATCOM costs will
exceed $10 billion [ Kef . 1: p. 26]. Because of increasing
dependence on and cost of these systems, the DOD has sought
the most cost effective means of acquisition. The lease
versus buy question is part of this move toward cost
efficiency.
To address lease/buy decisions adequately, the Unite I
States Navy has adopted a decision model to facilitate the
evaluation and decision process as it pertains to the acqui-
sition of satellite communications capabilities [Bef. 2].
That model is the subject of this thesis.
A. OBJECTIVES
The underlying purpose of this thesis is to analyze the
Navy's present lease versus buy methodology as it pertains
to space-based communications systems capacity and capa-
bility. The analysis is intended to be comprehensive and
will address all relevant factors in the lease/buy decision
of MILSATCOM.
First, what are thought to be the customary advantages
and disadvantages of leasing? Of buying? In the civilian
marketplace, long-term capital leasing has been on the
upswing since the late 1960's. What accounts for this
phenomenon? Do the same economic forces play for the
Federal Government in its evaluation of lease/buy options?
If not, what circumstances are different and how should they
shape the Navy's lease/buy decisions? These factors are
essential to a comprehensive understanding of lease versus
buy options for MILSATCOM.
Second, regarding the decision model presently used by
the Navy in its lease versus buy evaluations, what are its
strengths and weaknesses? What aspects of the decision, if
any, are inadequately addressed in the model? Can the model
be altered to expand its effectiveness in addressing all
relevant factors in the decision? Such questions must be
thoroughly addressed before any policy analysis is complete.
Third, there are factors in a MILSATCOM lease/buy deci-
sion which tend to be unquantifiable due to uniquely mili-
tary requirements of the systems and due to public versus
private sector acquisition- Because increasing national
security is the ultimate objective of any military program,
a si mple dollar and cents comparison of alternatives often
falls short in addressing the qualitative factors. Any
decision model must include an evaluation of the unquantifi-
abie as well as the quantifiable facets impacting the lease
versus buy decision. A major portion of this thesis will be
devoted to the analysis of the unquantifiables and how they
affect the approach to and method of the lease versus buy
evaluation.
Last, if the analysis is extended to focus not only on
the Navy's objectives but also the objectives of the entire
DOD and beyond even that level to include the entirety of
the federal Government, does the analysis take on different
dimensions? Do the decisions and results remain the same?
Ultimately, the question to be addressed is what is the best
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method in securing the greatest amount of national security
foe the dollars spent on space-based telecommunications
systems. Is this basic question thoroughly considered in
the Navy's lease versus buy decisions? Are all underlying
biases and assumptions made clear during the decision
process? Herein lie the crux and thrust of this thesis.
B. OBGANIZATIOH
This study is organized into chapters, each with a
specific purpose and set of questions entertained.
Chapter II provides the foundations for the entire
thesis by defining basic terms of the lease/buy discussion.
It also addresses private versus public sector leasing and
how DOD leasing of HILSATCOH systems has been applied in the
past. Congressional interest in HILSATCOM acquisition is
also considered.
Chapter III introduces the standard arguments for and
against leasing; for and against buying. The chapter
discusses three broad areas for consideration in any lease/
buy assessment: technical performance impact, management
impact and financial implications. The basic attractiveness
of leasing to Federal agencies is described and considered,
as well.
Chapter IV analyzes the specific model presently used by
the Navy in assessing lease versus buy decisions for
EILSATCOM. In so doing, a general lease/buy model is formu-
lated in accordance with General Accounting Office's proce-
dures and guidelines. The Navy's model is then evaluated
using this general model as a performance measure. Specific
quantitative formulae of the model are addressed in general
terms only.
Chapter V discusses elements of the lease/buy decision
which are either not addressed in the Navy's model or are
1 1
underrepresented in the model. These shortcomings fall into
three categories:
1. Faulty underlying assumptions on which the model is
based;
2. Important considerations in the MILSATCOM system
decision problem which are not adequately addressed
in the Navy's decision model; and
3. The comparison the model makes is deceptive in that
it does not compare the two financing mechanisms in
the acquisition of the same MILSATCOM system.
The presence of faulty assumptions at the foundation of the
Navy's lease/buy model calls into question the validity of
leasing as a cost effective means of acquiring satellite
communications capacity and capability. Also, the model
fails to address such unique MILSATCOM system requirements
as survivability and interoperability. In addition, the
molel fails to formulate the lease/buy analysis based on the
same system being acquired by the two financing options.
These concepts are dealt with extensively in Chapter V.
Chapter VI deals with recommendations and conclusions to
the foregoing policy analysis. Recommendations deal not
only with the Navy's posture on the lease/buy question but
also the posture of the Federal Government in its entirety
and the American society as a whole.
Although the opinions expressed herein lo not reflect
nor represent those of the United States Navy nor the
Department of Defense, they are set forth in the hope and
with the intention to provoke thought and stimulate discus-
sion of the issues surrounding the MILSATCOM lease/buy
decision.
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II. SETTING THE BACKGROUND TO THE LEASE VEESDS BOY QUESTION
In order to formulate and understand the basic issues
surrounding the lease versus buy decision, a foundation of
information is required. First, basic terms must be
reviewed to ensure the central issues of the lease/buy ques-
tion will be addressed with a common background of clarity
and understanding. Second, the emergence and evolution of
leasing as a means of acquiring services must be considered.
Last, the application of leasing in the public sector and in
particular to MI1SATCCM systems will be addressed.
A- DEFINITION DF TEBHS
To begin, a few terms must be defined. What is a lease?
And, what is a buy? Both terms seem quite familiar and to
present no ambiguity. However, this is simply not the case.
1 . To Bu y
"To buy" means "to obtain in exchange for money or
its equivalent: to purchase" [ Ref - 3]. But procurement
within the Federal Government carries with it many more
stipulations and facets beyond just the exchange of money
foe the ownership of some property. To procure or buy a
MILSATCGM system, for instance, the executive service 1 for
the system must first state the requirement for the system
and then justify its need within the DOD. Next, the inclu-
sion of the system in the DOD Budget must be ensured, and,
last, justification of the requirement for the system
1 "Executive service" refers to the military service
which is designated by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense as the leader among the services in the project
acquisition and management of a particular system to be used
by more than one of the military services.
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outside DOD, i.e. to both Houses of Congress, must be given.
Once Congressional support has been obtained, no small feat
in and of itself, funds must be appropriated and then
authorized by both Houses, a process rife with pitfalls for
even the most urgent of military programs. Once beyond the
funding hurdle, a contract for the design, development and
production of the system must be negotiated and administered
through each phase of the program ultimately to its deploy-
ment and operation. The process is a long and tedious one,
and at no point along the way is the system* s future
assured. Only once the system is in-orbit and fully opera-
tional is the "buy" a sure thing.
2 . To Lease
"Lease" is another term which seems quite simple in
its meaning, "to contract, granting occupancy or use of
property during a certain period in exchange for a specified
rent" [Ref. 3]. A lease is really a form of contract which
stipulates the conditions of ownership and use of a partic-
ular property. In the case of MILSATCOM systems, the "prop-
erty" is either the use of services or equipment in the
satellite system. Such a contract defines the leasing party
as a lessee and the other, or owning party, as the lessor.
It is the lessee who receives the right to use the subject
property in a lease, and it is the lessor who usually
retains ownership of the property. A contractual lease
specifies a period of time in which the lease is operative
and stipulates an amount of money periodically paid by the
lessee to the lessor for the use of the property.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is much more
precise in its definition of lease, however. The IRS recog-
nizes two types of leases: the true lease and the condi-
tional sale or pseudo lease. To be considered a true lease
for tax purposes, the property owner must have title to the
14
property and have no guaranteed end-of-lease purchase price
on the property. In ether words, to be eligible for the tax
benefits of ownership, the lessor must assume and retain
full risks of ownership. Furthermore, the initial lease
cannot run for 100 percent of the asset's economic life or
else the lease is considered by the IRS to be a defacto
purchase. [Ref. 4] The classification as a true lease
results in the major financial benefit attributed to
leasing, that of tax benefits accruing to the lessor who in
turn, passes on these savings to the lessee in the form of
lower leasing rates [Bef. 5: p. 2 J. Senerally, the IRS will
classify a lease as a true lease if it provides that the
property or equipment to be leasei will have at least one
year of its life expectancy remaining at the end of the
lease; if the lessor assumes for financial-reporting
purposes that it will have a residual value of at least 20
percent of its original cost; and if the owner-lessor puts
up at least 20 percent of the cost in equity funds [fief. 6:
p. 27]. Figure 2.1 depicts a simple lease and the elements
involved.
The pseudo lease, on the other hand, recognizes the
lessee as the owner for tax purposes and because the lessor
realizes no tax benefit, the lease rate cannot be reduced to
make it competitive with a conventionally financed purchase.
Thus, designation as a pseudo lease is unsatisfactory from
both the lessee and lessor perspectives.
3 . Types of Lea ses
There are various types of leases which must be
considered, as well. Those of particular interest to this
study are the finance or equipment lease, the operating or
service lease, and the leveraged lease.
In the finance lease or equipment lease, the lessee










Figure 2-1 Diagram of a Simple Lease
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The lessee assumes responsibility for the maintenance, taxes
and insurance costs associated with the asset's use- The
lessor's interests lie not in the management of the asset
but in the return on investment the lease of the asset
represents. [Ref. 7: p. 7] In terms of MILSATCOM, an equip-
ment lease means the Government leases in-orbit satellites
and then assumes control of those satellites. In such a
system, it is up to the lessor to provide or contract out
for the launch, launching services and Tracking, Telemetry
and Control (TTSC) services during the satellite check out
phase. Such activities are assumed to have occurred prior
to the system being "delivered" to the Government. The cost
of these services is, of course, included in the lease
determination process [Hef. 5: p. 2]. Equipment leasing,
then, provides virtually the same rights of control over an
asset as does owning it.
The operating lease or service lease is a short-term
lease, usually for a period of time considerably less than
the leased asset's useful life. The lessor's return on
investment depends not only on the original leasing agree-
ment but also on the residual value of the asset and on
subsequent renewals or renegotiations of the lease after the
initial lease arrangement. The lessor generally pays taxes,
insurance and maintenance costs on the asset [Ref. 7: p. 7].
In a satellite communications service lease, the lessee is
provided with a specified amount of communication capacity.
It is up to the lessor as to how that capacity is provided.
Service leasing provides control through the lessor, only.
The lessee's only rights are to the service which the equip-
ment or property provides, not to the equipment or property
itself.
The leveraged lease deserves a whole chapter unto
itself. It is a complex, still evolving contractual leasing
type which developed from the basic equipment lease, as
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described above, in order to capitalize on the tax advan-
tages of ownership without incurring the whole costs of that
ownership. The leveraged lease introduces a third party to
the leasing arrangement: a long-term lender. It is this
third party who loans funds, usually a substantial portion
of the asset's cost (50 to 80 percent is common), to the
lessor for the purchase of the asset. [Ref. 6: p. 29] The
lessor is thus enabled to lease the asset with a small
initial outlay, possibly as low as 20 percent, while
retaining the tax benefits of full ownership of the asset.
The "leveraging" results in the splitting of the lease into
debt and eguity portions. The debt holder, the third party
addressed above, is usually a large bank or insurance
company who puts up most of the cost of the asset. In
return, the debt holder receives most of the lease payments
which represent interest and the reduction of principal.
The eguity holder, or the lessor, remains the legal owner of
the asset and puts up the remaining initial cost and
receives the rest of the rental income. And the lessor
retains all the tax benefits associated with ownership.
Also, at the end of the lease term, the lessor, in fact,
owns the equipment. [Ref. 8: p. 132] Figure 2.2 depicts the
participants and interactions of a simple leveraged lease
arrangement. A leveraged lease can be much more complicated
than the one depicted in Figure 2.2, however. Oftentimes,
such a lease involves a multi-million dollar project which
is so complex that experts in tax accounting and law are
required to design and construct it.
Although these have been concise and somewhat
general descriptions of the types of leases, they are
sufficient for the analysis to be conducted herein. The
intent of the discussion is to gain an appreciation of the
different types of leases and who it is and how it is that
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Figure 2-2 Diagram of a Simple Leveraged Lease
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B. LEASING IN THE PBIVATE SECTOB
Equipment leasing in the private sector is not new. In
fact, in the ship chartering industry it is rather ancient.
However, the scope and intensity of the activity have
increased tremendously in the last fifteen years. In 1972,
new equipment worth over $11 billion was leased, accounting
for approximately 14 percent of all business investment in
capital equipment. The volume of leasing increased by 20
percent in that year, alone £Bef. 8: p. 190]. That
percentage remained operative a decade later, as well.
Equipment leasing grew by about 20 percent in 1983 [Bef. 9:
p. 110], and leasing is now estimated to be a $150 billion
per year activity [Bef. 10].
"Why is it that leasing has become such a growing busi-
ness? What economic factors have served to popularize this
form of investment and why?
The leasing explosion dates back to 1963 when the
Comptroller of the Currency ruled that banks could lease
personal property. By the late sixties, many of the large
banks had began to exploit the new opportunities. Then, the
liquidity squeeze of 1969-70 got many corporate treasurers
interested and involved in the "new" financing methods. In
197 1, the Federal Reserve Board allowed member banks to form
holding companies to engage in equipment leasing. At that
time, many small packaging firms sprang up to meet the
rising demand for specialized leasing expertise and
services, [fief. 8: p. 136] The Investment Tax Credit (ITC)
went a long way in encouraging the growth of equipment
leasing, as well. The ITC is a reduction of a firm's tax
liability which accrues after an investment is made in a
"qualified" capital asset. The redaction is currently 10
percent of the amount invested [Bef. 11: p. 71].
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Nothing went quite so far, though, in giving impetus to
the leasing boom as did the passage of the Economic Recovery
Tax Act (EETA) of 1981. In essence, ERTA relaxed the speci-
fications which a lease must meet to be classified a "true"
lease by the IRS. The intent of ERTA was to assist small,
struggling businesses by offering them incentives to
purchase new equipment and machinery without requiring
substantial amounts of capital investment [Ref. 6: p. 30].
Such companies were allowed to sell their tax benefits
resulting from new purchases of equipment to more profitable
companies. Then the equipment would be leased back by the
original company. The more profitable companies became the
J,
lessors and reaped attractve rates of return through the
purchase of tax benefits [Ref. 6: p. 31]. Such sale-
leaseback arrangements became known as tax benefit transfers
(TBTs) or safe harbor leasing. The "safe harbor" label was
attached because the IRS agreed to consider the transactions
exempt from most existing lease regulations [Ref. 12: p.
92].
Although the ERTA provisions enjoyed quick and extensive
popularity within the business community, the costs were
seen as prohibitive to the U.S. Treasury. Therefore, in
1982, the ERTA provisions were modified by the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) . Simply stated, TEFRA
reinstated the previous IRS requirements for true lease
classification thereby closing the "safe harbor" [Ref. 13:
p. 242 ]. However, because ERTA had attracted many firms
into such leasing deals, they experienced firsthand the
sometimes impressive tax advantages of leveraged leasing.
For a company with profits to shelter, the yield from
conventional leveraged leasing typically runs from fifteen
to twenty percent [Ref. 12: p. 94]. Therefore, ERTA served
to involve more companies in leveraged leasing and to lend
greater respectability to leasing as an investment
opportunity.
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C. PUBLIC SECTOR LEASIHG OF MILSATCOM
The growth of leasing in the private sector has been
charted. It is now time to consider its emergence in the
public arena with special emphasis on its occurrence in the
acquisition of MILSATCOM system capabilities.
Several near simultaneous yet unrelated events helped
shape the emergence and evolution of the MILSATCOM lease
versus buy question. The first was the failure of a
tactical satellite program to support the Navy in 1972
[Ref. 14: p. 127]. The second was a General Accounting
Office (GAO) response to a House Appropriations Committee
request [Ref. 15: p. 1 ].
1 . GAPFILLER
In 1972 the failure of Tactical Satellite (TACSAT} I
resulted in a gap in Navy tactical communications. To fill
that gap on an interim basis, the Navy entered into a
service or operating lease with COMSAT General Corporation
to utilize part of the Maritime Satellite Communications
(MARISAT) system. The Navy's leased services from the
MARISAT system became known as GAPFILLER. GAPFILLER is a
constellation of three satellites providing three-ocean
coverage in geosynchronous orbit over the Atlantic, Pacific
and Indian Oceans. Ihe system provides UHF communications
services to the Navy, Army, Air Force and Joint Chiefs of
Staff as well as to commercial merchant marine fleet
vessels. In 1973, The Navy signed a fixed price lease
contract for $27.9 million covering a two year period with
an option to renew the contract for a third. The Navy has
leen leasing the system ever since not only due to the 1972
TACSAT failure but also to fill "the gap" caused by delays
in the Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM) and the
Leased Satellite (LEASAT) programs. The contract does run
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out in 1985, however, and is expected to terminate at that
time. As the contracts have been written, COMSAT retained
responsibility for tracking and control stations, system
operations and reliability of services. GAPFILLEE repre-
sents "off the shelf" design and technology and, therefore,
has no survivability features. [ Bef . 14: pp. 128-130]
However, it has performed well with system availability
exceeding 99.9 percent. The system has supplemented
MILSATCOM capacity and filled shortfalls created by failed
and delayed systems £Ref. 7: p. 10].
2 . Congressional Interest in MI LSATCOM Acc^ui si tio ns
GAPFILLER and the emergence of the commercial satel-
lite industry in the United States spurred the interest of
Congress as to the possible advantages of further leasing
opportunities in the world of MILSATCOM systems. In October
1973, the House Appropriations Committee requested the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to review the cost and
schedule experiences of both DOD and the commercial sector's
communications satellite programs. The GAO findings were
somewhat disheartening. It seemed that the average costs to
develop, procure and launch the military's latest genera-
tions of communications satellites were greater than the
most expensive commercial satellites. Systems included in
the study were the Navy's FLTSATCOM system and the Defense
Satellite Communications System (DSCS II and III) on the
military side and FESTAE, COMSTAR and INTELSAT I to IV on
the commercial side. [Ref. 15: p. 1] The military's higher
costs were chalked up to the more sophisticated design
requirements of the military, more costly development
programs which included many design and developmental
changes, and schedule delays which resulted in the require-
ment for short-term, operational fixes, such as the one
which resulted in the leasing of GAPFILLEE. In other words,
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the military's increased technological complexity resulted
in greater technical risk and higher program costs. The
commercial satellite systems tended to be more conservative
in design and, therefore, more manageable in production.
[Ref . 15: p. 3 ] However, before the report had even been
requested, the House of Representatives Defense
Appropriations Bill for FY 1978 had included this statement:
"...The committee recommends a major policy change.
Henceforth, DOD should, in the committee's view, lease
not buy communications satellites. These should be
based upon incremental rather tnan revolutionary
improvements, should be fully competitve, and should be
so designed that individual DOD commands or programs
will be charged the full costs of services received."
[Ref. 16: p. 15]
3. IEASAT
The Navy entered into another leasing arrangement
due to the pressures exerted by Congress and the seeming
advantages derived from such an economic instrument
[Ref. 17: p. 6 21]. LEASAT, the Navy's Leased Satellite
system, provides worldwide UHF communications services to
ships, submarines. Navy aircraft and other mobile users. It
is a five satellite system, four in geosynchronous orbit
with one ground spare. Its design life is ten years and the
system is designed to replace 3APFILLER and FLTSATCOM.
[Ref. 17: pp. 640-64 1] LEASAT is leased directly from Hughes
Communications Services, Incorporated (HCSI), a fully owned
subsidiary of Hughes Aircraft Corporation. Ths lease is for
a five year period, $67 million per year or a total of $335
million for the five years. The contract is a leveraged
leasing arrangement whereby HCSI sells the satellites to a
group of banks after the satellites are launched and tested
in orbit. HCSI then leases the system back from the banks
for seven years simultaneously leasing it to the Navy for
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five years. After the five years, HCSI may lease services
to other users or renegotiate and extend the lease to the
Navy. [Ref. 7: pp. 16-17] LEASAT has incorporated substan-
tial Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) including dual
channel onboard processors for each spacecraft and encryp-
tion devices. The system has less capability than FLTSATCOM
due largely to the elimination of some of the Air Force
mission requirements of FLTSATCOM. [Ref. 17: p. 642] LEASAT
was designed for space shuttle launch and originally sched-
uled for a 1980 launch. However, due to Space Shuttle
delays, the first launch of a LEASAT bird took place in
August 1984. The slippage required the renegotiation of the
contract between the Navy and HCSI. [Ref. 18]
LEASAT is the most costly and most sophisticated
MILSATCOM system to be leased by the DOD. Its effectiveness
as a system cannot yet be determined, but the methodology
used in choosing to lease the system rather than purchase it
was based on the decision model which is the subject of this
thesis. [Ref. 18]
D. CONCLUSION
The reliable performance of GAPFILLER which had little
to do with its being a leased system or not, coupled with
the emergence of the commercial satellite industry in the
late 1970s led some within DOD and Congress to herald the
benefits of leasing as the more cost effective means .of
acquiring MILSATCOM services. However, all the pieces of
the puzzle have not yet fallen into place. In chapter
three, the attractiveness of the lease option will be
further considered. Also, the evolution of Congressional
interest and position concerning lease versus buy will be
followed and the standard arguments for both options will be
addressed fully.
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Ill- FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION IN A LEASE VERSOS BOY
ASSESSMENT
The Congressional hearings on the 1978 Defense
Appropriations Bill did not leave much to the discretion of
the DOD. The Navy was directed to lease rather than buy its
next comunications satellite system [Ref. 19: p. 7]. The
reasons cited for this recommendation were "the record of
poor DOD program management, cost overruns, schedule delays
and failure to provide acceptable service" [Ref. 16: p. 15].
The basis for this position was a report published by the
House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations
Team which criticized DOD management of space-based communi-
cations systems. The report cited the following factors in
support of leasing required services:
"Frcm a DOD management standpoint there are several
otential advantages to leasing service:
A lease/buy analysis should show that leasing is
cheaper;
B. "Low Ball" bidding is discouraged;
C. Service will probably be obtained quicker and (be)
more responsive to user needs;
D. Cuts government bureaucratic overhead, including
support-
E. Relies on competitive marketplace to control total
system costs;
F. No money is obligated until service is rendered;
G. Communications service will not be allowed as a
"Free Good" to users;
H. Reduces technical content of top-level DOD
decisions;
I. Risk assessment is performed in the private sector;
J. Total system costs are immediately visible."
[Ref. 16: pp. 15-16]
There are three aspects of the lease versus buy decision
which are generally addressed in MILSATC3M lease/buy
analyses: [Ref. 5: p. E2]. the technical, financial and
management implications of each option. The position of the
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House of Representatives Appropriations Committee, as stated
above, seems to be based on financial and management consid-
erations, primarily. But all the aspects require considera-
tion. Each of these three areas is addressed individually
in this chapter. However, because it is so difficult to
separate the technical issues from the management issues,
the two discussions tend to overlap.
A. TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE LEASE VERSOS BOY EVALUATION
First, the technical considerations relating to the
lease and buy alternatives stem from the technological
requirements of HILSATCOM systems and the risks involved
with them. As the technology of a system approaches the
state of the art, the cost of the system increases dramati-
cally [Ref. 20: p. 78]. The very nature of MILSATCOM system
objectives usually requires pursuing the leading edge in
technological capabilities [Ref- 21: p. 56]. This require-
ment for state of the art technology results in increased
technical risks [Ref. 7: p. 25]. and, therefore, has reper-
cussions on the lease/buy decision.
For the lease, requirements are usually stated in terms
of service and performance to be provided by the satellite
system [Ref. 5: p. E2]. Since satellite specifications are
considered in performance terras rather than design, the
system contractor may be able to realize significant savings
in optimizing design and construction without being
subjected to the rigors of a Government purchase contract
which must be justified and rejustified throughout the
design and development phases. The lease strategy usually
requires that the design be "frozen" at the time of contract
award thereby allowing for a more smoothly running program
with fewer chances for delay due to design changes.




For the buy alternative, requirements are almost always
written in terms of design specificationsinstead of perform-
ance specifications £Bef. 5: p. E2]- The design specifica-
tions may te changed to accommodate changing requirements
and/or technology- Such changes most often involve many
layers of review for ultimate approval. Program delays and
increased costs usually result [Ref- 5: p. 19]-
Therefore, in the technical performance area, there are
tradeoffs between the two alternatives, the lease and the
buy. With the lease, the benefits are generally thought to
te a more smoothly running program with fewer delays. The
lease is less flexible, however, in the development phase
because its design and specifications are held frozen to the
time of the contract award. Of course, the lease contract
can be modified to accommodate changes, but the attendant
cost growth and schedule slippages are oftentimes prohib-
itive. [Eef. 5: p. 20] The buy alternative allows for
greater technical flexibility but at the potential expense
of program delays and increased costs. The lease alterna-
tive, on the other hand, tends to constrain the performance
of MILSATCON systems to achievable, demonstrated technology.
To review, the technical aspects of the lease and buy
alternatives center around "off the shelf" versus state of
the art technologies. There is actually a spectrum of
alternatives between these two end points. The objective of
any decision model is to assist the decision maker in
arriving at the optimal choice of technologies, cost and
performance capability. [Ref- 22: p. 13]
B. MAHAGEHEHT ASPECTS OF THE LEASE VERSUS BOY EVALUATION
The managerial considerations impacting the MILSATCOM
system lease/buy decision are numerous. They are not unre-
lated to the technical considerations and, oftentimes, in
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fact, go hand in hand with the technical aspects as well as
the financial.
With a lease, the satellite services can often be
obtained more quickly because they generally represent
proven, "off the shelf" technology [Ref. 23: p. 24].
Because the lease is based on performance rather than design
specifications, the manufacturer is allowed to achieve a
greater efficiency in the system's design and construction
[Ref. 5: p. 19]. Because the lease allows for predictable,
periodic cash flows as determined in the contract, manage-
ment requirements outside the Department of Defense are
lessened. The lease does not require annual review in the
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) and,
therefore, requires less administrative and management
efforts [Ref. 24: p. 3]. Also, internal to the DOD, the
contractual process, itself, is simplified because MILS ATCOM
systems need not compete with higher priority programs for
procurement funding [fief. 25: p. 5]. The funding aspects
will be amplified further in the next section on the finan-
cial aspects of the lease/buy decision.
The lease option also lessens management overhead both
in the planning and administrative phases of the program
because once the specifications are determined and contrac-
tually agreed to, it is up to the manufacturer and lessor to
meet those requirements [Ref. 24: p. 3]. Management
requirements on the part of the military program sponsors
are, therefore, minimized once the contract has been let.
The tradeoff to this lessening of management overhead is the
flexibility and control of design which the buy option
affords the Government [Ref. 5: p. E4].
Other management considerations and decisions come at
the point of contract negotiation [Ref. 5: p. E5]. They
pertain to leasing contracts in particular but may impinge
on the buy contract decision, as well. Such considerations
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include the contract type, whether it is fixed price, cost
plus fixed fee or some variation of the two; the payment
plan; and the period of the lease contract, and therefore,
the period of performance of the system- Also, incentive
and penalty provisions must be specified, defining exactly
what is considered satisfactory versus unsatisactory
performance of the system. These provisions must also
specify Government versus contractor liabilities. Last, the
benefits of and extent of use of Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE) must be considered and contracted for as
well as logistics and maintenance support to be provided for
the system- [Ref. 16: pp. 31-35]
In summary, the managerial aspects to be considered in
the lease versus buy MILSATCOM system decision synthesize
into the tradeoff between managerial control and the costs
associated with such control- With the lease option, there
is reduced management costs to the Government in terms of
personnel assigned and administrative costs associated with
higher staffing levels. What is lost with the lease option
is the technical and managerial control which is derived
from the buy option. Although a purchase is more costly in
terms of managerial and administrative overhead, the cogent
question remains: is this greater cost offset by the
benefits reaped in the area of management control? There is
also the question of whether the seeming benefits of the
lease can be derived from a buy alternative if only the
specifications and contract are devised in order to achieve
those benefits. In other words, if the specifications are
written and the contract negotiated such that a particular
buy option would also freeze design and/or performance spec-
ifications and would ensure the manufacturer the same amount
of flexibility and control in development and production as
a lease would afford, could not management costs be kept
lower and savings accrue to the Government as in the case of
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a lease? In short, there is a whole gamut of choices and
decisions on the "continuum" from a simple lease to a simple
buy. Neither alternative has aspects that cannot be
achieved through the other alternative given a willingness
to absorb increased costs or to accept less technical and/or
managerial control. These issues and guestions will be
discussed more thoroughly in subseguent chapters.
C. FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE LEASE VERSUS BOY EVALUATION
The financial aspects of the lease/buy decision are more
complex and somewhat convoluted. There are both funding and
cost factors to be considered within the financial category.
First, the funding dissimilarities between the two
options revolve around what "color" of monies are required
for each and at what time in the lifecycle of the satellite
system the funds are required [Ref. 5: p. E3]. The lease
option spreads costs over the lifetime of the lease. The
dollars required to pay the lease are Operations and
Maintenance (OSM) funds. The uniform flow of 0511 funds
occurs concurrently with the in-orbit service period.
[Ref. 5: p. 7]. The lease option costs less on an annual
basis, but the total cost of the lease package is higher due
to insurance costs, the cost of capital and return on
investment incurred by and due to the lessor [Ref. 5: p.
E3]. Also, because the lease option spreads the cost of the
system over several years, there can be a problem of
obligating future administrations by the contractual lease
ana a loss of flexibility with respect to the allocation of
O&M monies [Ref. 5: p. 11]- However, some proponents of
leasing consider its cost advantages to be the limits it
places on cost growth [Ref. 24: p. 3] and its lower
processing and handling costs [Ref. 16: p. 15].
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With the buy alternative, on the other hand, procurement
monies must be justified and budgeted via the annual budget
process [Ref. 16: p. 16]. With purchases, large upfront
outlays are required during the Research and Development
(R&D) phase, and an annual review of the program by DOD and
Congress may jeopardize the system's acquisition each year
[Ref. 24: p. 3]. In other words, with the buy option, a
system will come under much greater question and scrutiny
during the budgeting process.
Such are the funding considerations between the lease
and buy alternatives. There are also what may be called
cost considerations which include risk assessment [Ref. 7:
p. 24] and tax considerations [Ref. 11: p. 43]. They are
addressed separately below.
1 . Financia 1 Risks
When addressing space-based communications systems,
risk must be considered. There are two types of risk
involved in such systems, technical risk and financial risk.
Technical risk is simply that risk which is assumed by the
designers and producers of systems which push the state of
the art. Financial risk is closely linked to technical
risk. It represents the investors' potential dollars at
risk with the deployment of a particular system. Technical
and financial risk are related in that the higher the tech-
nical risk, the greater the financial risk. When a
MILSATCOM system does not perform to requirements, the
replacement or partial replacement of the system and the
costs involved in such replacement represent the financial
risk assumed by the owner of the system. [Ref. 7: pp.
25-26]
The primary difference between the MILSATCOM system
lease and buy alternatives is thought by some to be merely a
question of who bears the financial risks of technological
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failure [Ref. 5: p. 20]. As the rationale goes, under a
lease, the financial burden of technological risk falls upon
the private sector, i.e. the stockholders of the lessor
company. Under the buy option the risk and burflen fall upon
tha Government, and ultimately, on the taxpayers. With such
a perspective, the lease/buy decision becomes much simpler
in that decision variables cluster around private sector
versus public sector risk assumption and the equity and
efficiency questions attendant to such discussions.
[Ref. 7: pp. 24-26]
In any case, the financial risks associated with
MILSATCOM systems represent major concerns in the lease/buy
analysis. The cost of such systems makes replacement a
major consideration and the inherent financial risk high.
"Economic agents are risk averse. This means they will not
tear risk voluntarily, unless paid to do so," [Hef. 7: p.
26]. Such is the position of companies entertaining the
possibility of entering the MILSATCOM system arena. What
then is their inducement? With- financial risks potentially
so high, why does any firm decide to assume them? What
inducements and incentives are present to attract commercial
entities into the world of MILSATCOM system leasing? These
questions are answered simply: tax incentives.
2- Tax Incent ives
Although capital leasing has been increasing dramat-
ically since the early 1970s as outlined in the previous
chapter, it has been legislation in this decade which has
given impetus to its notable increase in the public sector.
[Ref. 25: p. 3]
There are various tax implications which make
leasing MILSATCOM systems to the Government attractive to
commercial firms. The leveraged lease is dependent upon
these tax benefits to provide the lessor with an acceptable
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rate of return, while providing the lessee with a lease rate
that is below the normal cost of financing [Ref- 26: p. 33].
In the leveraged lease, the lessor's rate of return is
derived, principally, from two sources: (1) whatever excess
there is from the lease payment, itself, after principal and
interest have been paid to the debt holder and (2) the tax
benefits accruing from ownership of the system [Ref- 11: p.
61].
These tax benefits fail into two categories. First,
there is depreciation. Accounting for depreciation
according to generally accepted accounting principles is "a
system of accounting which aims to distribute the cost or
other basic value of tangible capital assets, less salvage
value (if any) , over the estimated useful life of the unit
in a systematic and rational way" [Ref. 27: p. 4]. The
central issues surrounding the depreciation question are the
period of depreciation and the method of allocation used.
[Ref. 27: p. 5]
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 19S1 (ERTA) greatly
affected both the period of depreciation and the method of
allocation authorized for capital investments. Under EF.TA,
depreciable property could be classified into five property
classes, each of which generally provides increased depreci-
ation allowances for most business property. What ERTA did
through this Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) was
allow firms to ignore traditional useful life and salvage
value concepts in favor of a shortened period of deprecia-
tion. The Act also affected the technique or method of
allocation to be used in estimating depreciation costs and
increased the percentage of decreasing-charge depr aciation
methods allowed [Ref. 28: pp. 20-21 ]. All decreasing-charge
methods, the most common of which are the declining-balance
and the sum-of -the- years' -digits methods, assign a larger
amount of the cost cf a depreciable asset to the earlier
34
years of its depreciable life [Ref. 27: p. 101]. What these
two provisions of ER TA have done is enhance the attractive-
ness of leasing for equity holders. Although the Tax Equity
and Financial Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) repealed
some aspects of ERTA, the changes discussed above which
significantly affected the period of depreciation and the
method of allocation through ACRS remained substantially
intact [Ref. 28: p. 22]- Therefore, since ERTA and ACRS,
much greater depreciation amounts can be written off in the
early years of the lifecycle of a capital investment thereby
allowing the equity holder greater opportunities for
investment.
The second category of tax benefit accruing to the
equity holder of a HILSATCOJJ system is the Investment Tax
Credit (ITC) . Tax credits granted on the basis of invest-
ment outlays were first introduced in the United States in
1962 with the Investment Tax Credit Act of 1962 [Ref. 29: p.
2]- What the ITC does is reduce the amount of taxes
required of businesses purchasing capital assets. In
effect, this allows the lessor to claim a specified
percentage of new capital investment as a credit against
income taxable in the current year [Ref. 29: p. 51]. The
present ITC amount is ten percent [Ref. 28: p. 21] which
means that for a $1,000,000 MIISATSOM system bought in 1985,
the equity holder could deduct $100,000 from its 1985 taxes
due to the ITC authorized by that amount of capital
investment.
Thus, in recent years the attractiveness of lever-
aged leases contracted with Government agencies has
increased substantially. And though financial and technical
risks may be high for MILSATCOM systems, the tax incentives
accruing to the lessor are more than enough to compensate
foe the risks involved. Such a statement is attested to by
the recent LEASAT contract in which several commercial
P
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satellite producers submitted bids for the system.
[Ref. 19: pp. 7-10]
There are tradeoffs to be made in any lease/buy
decision. Each alternative has its strengths and weaknesses
when considered from the technical, the management and the
financial perspectives. Judging from the quotation which
begins this chapter, portions of the Congress were leaning
very heavily in favor of the lease option as the preferred
means of acquiring HILSATCOM systems in the late 1970's.
However, by 1983, there was a shift in thinking. [Ref. 6:
p. 58] The obvious question is: why?
D. GROWING CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN AND ACTION IN THE
LEASE/BOY ARENA
In 1983, the General Accounting Office (GAO) was
requested by Congress to "review the practices and proce-
dures followed by the Government in its long-term leasing of
capital equipment" [Ref. 25: p. 1 ]. The GAO study in
response to this request limited its focus to four military
programs, the Navy's noncombatant auxiliary cargo (TAKX) and
tanker (T-5) ships and the Air Force's trainer (CT-39
replacement) and Tanker Transport Bomber (TTB) aircraft.
The specific issues addressed in the study included:
1. The magnitude of long-term leasing in the public
sector, and particularly within DOD;
2. The reasons the services would rather lease than
purchase capital equipment;
3. The potential effect of long-term leasing on military
capabilities;
4. The adequacy of the lease versus buy economic anal-
yses used by the services;
5. The need for full disclosure of long-term leasing
costs; and
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6. The possible need for legislative and administrative
changes to improve congressional oversight of long-
term leasing programs. £Ref. 25]
Quoting from the report in part:
"In general, a long-term
Erovides for leasing an asset for
e more expensive than purchasing
third party— the lessor— is invol
procurement arrangement, only t
manufacturer are involved. Thus,
that the third party will requ
investment and this will be passe
an added expense. If the lesso
return exceeds the Government's di
on Government securities, leasing
than purchasing. The reason is
expect to earn a higher rate of re
than he could earn bv investing in
and his added expense is passed






























































The GAO survey focused attention on the question of what
impact the leasing of capital assets by tax-exempt entities,
i.e. public sector entities, has on tne Federal economy as a
whole [Ref. 11s p. 57]. The report coincided with and rein-
forced growing Congressional concern over two central lease/
buy issues: (1) the magnitude of the loss of tax revenues
resulting from capital leases entered into by Federal agen-
cies; and (2) the lack of Congressional oversight and
control of leasing by such agencies. What Congress was
concerned about, then, was the "hidden" costs of public
sector leasing arrangements, "hidden" in the sense that they
are invisible until the tax benefits accruing to the lessor
are considered as losses to the Treasury and, therefore,
costs to the Government. Secondarily, Congress was
concerned about its lack of oversight of this type of
Federal "tax expenditure" or loss of revenue. [fief. 6: pp.
58-60]
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E. WHY LEASING BEHAINS ATTRACTIVE TO FEDERAL AGENCIES
Despite Congress* growing skepticism of leasing as a
cost effective method of acquiring military and non-DOD
services, the option remains attractive at the agency level.
Why?
The 1983 GAO report cited the following factors as
significant in the continued attractiveness of the lease
option to Federal agencies [Eef. 25: Appendix I, p. 1].
First, the costs of a project can be spread evenly over a
period of years. Second, the obligations incurred are
against working capital funds, i.e. O&M funds, versus
procurement funds. Third, the amount of scrutiny given by
Congress to purchases had been much greater than that given
to leasing arrangements. And, last, leasing almost always
appears less costly because part of the total cost shifts
from the agency's budget to the Treasury in the form of
reduced tax revenues.
F. CONCLUSION
In summary, the purpose of this chapter has been to
address the familiar and oft cited aspects of any lease
versus buy assessment identifying, in particular, the
dissimilarities of the two options in the areas of tech-
nical, managerial and financial considerations. In addi-
tion, the shift in Congressional opinion on the issues and
the reasons for that shift have been addressed to set the
stage for Chapter IV. The specific model used by the Navy
in its most recent lease versus buy decision for a space-
based satellite communications system will be the central
topic in the following chapter. The correct criteria for
any such decision model must be to determine the real costs
to the economy of all alternatives and to facilitate the
comparison of and assist the decision maker in comparing the
various choices.
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IV. ANALXSIS OF THE NAVYJ^S LEASE^BUY DECISIOS MODEL
"With the background now in hand, it is time to consider
the decision model presently used by the Navy in making its
MILSATCOM systems lease versus buy evaluations and choices.
First, this chapter will formulate a general lease versus
buy decision model, then the Navy's model will be juxtaposed
against this general model to ascertain its quantitative
strengths and weaknesses.
A. THE GENERAL LEASE/BUY METHODOLOGY
The General Accounting Office (GAO) set out a four step,
general lease/buy decision model when it addressed the
overall methodology used by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) in making its lease/purchase
comparison for the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
(TDRSS) . [Eef. 30: p. 1] The general model described below
is wholly based on that GAO model.
The first step according to GAO is the identification of
all cost categories associated with each of the alterna-
tives, the lease and the buy, during the economic life of
the system being considered. This portion of the modeling
task can be quite extensive especially for a highly complex
system with a large number of cost categories. [Ref. 30: p."
5]
The second step is to estimate the magnitude of each
cost category and the time in which the costs will be
incurred. Of course, this must be done for both the lease
and the buy alternatives. In addition, any offsetting cash
flows, such as tax implications, which are generated as a
result of incurring these costs must likewise be estimated
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including their magnitude and timing. Once this information
is garnered accurate estimates of the net cost implications
of each of the two alternatives can be derived. Costs whose
timing and amount are the same under both the lease and buy
options may be excluded from the analysis as they will have
no bearing on the relative attractiveness, or unattractive-
ness, of either alternative. [fief. 30: p. 5]
After the costs for the lease and buy options have been
identified and time phased, by year, over the useful life of
the system being considered, the annual cost figures must
then be converted into their present values. This, the
third step of the process, takes into account the time value
of money. [Ref. 30: p. 6]
The final step comes after the costs for both alterna-
tives have teen converted into present value terms. The two
amounts are then compared and the alternative with the lower
present value costs is considered the more economically
efficient. [Ref. 30: p. 6]
B. THE NAVY'S MODEL
') ' ^
The model currently used by the Navy in assessing its
lease versus buy MILSATCOM systems decisions was developed
foe use on an IBM-compatible personal computer with Lotus
1-2-3 software. [Eef. 31: p, 2]. Dr. Patricia M. Dinneen
while working at SAND Corporation formulated the model
program [Ref. 18], and in the opinion of the author, she
devised a flexible yet sophisticated tool by which to eval-
uate quantitatively MILSATCOM lease versus buy choices. The
model's stated objective is to:
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"Provide a general, flexible parametric model to assist
government and corporate decision makers in determining
when to lease rather than buy. The model can be used by
the Government to determine conditions under which
leasing is less costly than buying and by the private
firm to determine when leasing is more profitable than
selling." [Ref. 3 1: p. 1]
To ascertain whether the model matches the general
requirements set forth by GAO in its 1976 report outlined
above. Tables I and II reflect the specific information
suggested by GAO and the inputs available in Dr. Dinneen f s
decision model.
TABLE I
The General GAO lease/Buy Model
COST CATEGORIES INCLUDED IN THE MODEL:
Design phase contracts costs
Launch vehicles costs
Ground station facilities costs
Ground station equipment costs
Ground station operation and maintenance
costs
Lease payments costs
Supplemental network hardware costs




$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ TOTAL COSTS $$$$$$$$.T,2$$$$$
OTHEE INPUTS TO THE MODEL:
Estimated recovery of Federal income tax
Various Government discount rates
Net undiscounted cost to the Government
The tables include the specific wording used in the GAO
report on TDRSS [Ref. 30: p. 11] and in the Navy's decision
model [Ref. 31: pp. 2-7]. Although the cost category
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TABLE II
The Navy*s Lease/Buy Model
COST CATEGORIES INCLUDED IN THE MODEL:
Research, development, test and evaluation costs
Spacecraft cost
Launch vehicle cost





-Tracking, Telemetry and Control (TT&C) costs
Seller's profit rate and price in the case
of a buy
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ TOTAL COSTS $$$$$$$$.S$$ $2$
OTHER INPUTS OF THE MODEL:
Corporate tax rate
Government tax rate
In the case of a buy:
-Seller's discount rate
-Annual profile of costs and payments
In the case of a lease:




-Annual profile of costs and payments
-Period over which lessor pays back loan
descriptions vary slightly between the two models, substan-
tively, the cost inputs are the same- However, as can be
seen in Table II, the Navy model allows for a greater number
and flexibility of inputs which can be utilized to account
more accurately for decision variables and parameters.
However, this flexibility of inputs can also be manipulated
to skew the results of the analysis.
Due to this variety of inputs, the outputs of the two
models vary widely. Eor the GAO general model [Ref. 30: p.
11], the only outputs are the "Net cost to the Government,
discounted at XX percent" for the lease and the buy options,
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separately. For Dr. Dinneen's model, the outputs are much
more extensive. 2 The specific outputs for the Navy's model
are separated and listed by alternative. The buy outputs
are [Bef- 31: pp. 7-9] :
1. Seller's progress payments— the schedule and amount
of annual progress payments.
2. Seller's costs— the schedule and amount of annual
costs.
3. Seller's taxes— the schedule and amount of annual
taxes.
4. Seller's cash flow— the schedule and amount of annual
cash flows.
5. Seller's PDV$— the schedule and amount of annual,
present discounted value of seller's cash flow, using
the seller's discount rate.
6. Government cash flow—the schedule and amount of
annual cash flow.
7. Government's PDV$—the schedule and amount of annual
present discounted value of Government's cash flow,
using the Government's discount rate.
8. Agency's PDV$—the schedule and amount of annual
present discounted value of the Agency's cash flow.
This amount will differ from the Government's PDVS
2 The Navy's decision model includes two different
methods of use. The first method, referred to as the
"closed form", allows the user to specify the various
inputs. Given these values, the model calculates various
outputs, e.g. the net cash flows and total costs to the
Government under a lease compared to a buy. and the net cash
flows and internal rates of return to the manufacturer,
under a lease compared to a sale. The second or "open form'*
method, allows the user to specify the various inputs, and
the model calculates the Government's net cash flow and
total price under a buy. Having calculated the purchase
price, the model then solves for the corresponding lease
price such that the Government would be indifferent Between
leasing and buying. Once this lease price has been deter-
mined, the model selves for the lessor's internal rate of
return and compares it with that earned under a sale. By
incorporating two methods, the Dinneen model can be used to
analyze lease/buy decisions from various points of view:
the Government's, the Agency's, and the manufacturer's.
[Ref. 31: p.1]
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because the seller's taxes are excluded.
9. Seller's IRE—the Internal Rate of Return, defined as
that discount rate such that the present value of the
seller's cash flow is zero.
The lease outputs are [Kef- 31: p-9] :
1. Lease payment/target—'the amount of annual lease
payments, calculated on the basis of lessor's costs,
discount rate and the number of lease years.
2. Annual loan payment— the amount of annual loan
payments, calculated on the basis of the lessor's
costs, interest rate and number of loan years.
3. Lease payments—the schedule and amount of annual
lease payments.
4. Lessor's costs— the schedule and amount of annual and
administrative costs.
5. Lessor's loan payments— the schedule and amount of
annual loan payments spread over the designated
number of loan years.
Again, in the opinion of the author, this decision model
is a "user friendly" tool, useful in the evaluation of quan-
titative factors of the lease/buy decision. The model also
measures up very well to the criteria set for such models by
the GAO in Reference 29.
C. C0NC10SIOH
The quantitative cost categories associated with the
lease/buy decision are included in the Navy's model.
Setting the magnitude of these costs is left to the model
user. Because the user can vary these amounts, the model is
especially effective and useful in conducting sensitivity
analyses. The model also uses standard present value
formulae and is, therefore, effective in accurately repre-
senting the time value of money.
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However, to choose between a lease and a purchase of a
MILSATCOM system based solely on the inputs and outputs of
this model is to trivialize the lease/buy evaluation
process. Although the model is straightforward and flexible
in its applications, the value and validity of its outputs
depend not only on the accuracy and exactness of the inputs,
but also on the implicit assumptions which form the founda-
tion of the model methodology.
The next chapter will deal extensively with the qualita-
tive factors not addressed adequately in this model and will
make a case that is has a presumptive bias toward leasing as
the preferred option.
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V. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PRESENT MODEL
The Navy's lease versus buy decision model satisfacto-
rily meets the quantitative requirements set forth in the
General Accounting Office's general lease/buy methodology,
as discussed in the last chapter- However, there are
serious shortcomings to the model which, in the opinion of
the author, require consideration in this study's analysis
of the model. These shortcomings fall into three categories
for consideration:
1. Faulty underlying assumptions on which the model is
based;
2. Important considerations in the MILSATCOM system
decision problem which are not adequately addressed
in the Navy's decision model; and
3. The comparison the model makes is deceptive in that
it does not compare two financing mechanisms which
acquire the same MILSATCOM system. Rather, the lease
is assumed to be an instrument whereby all specifica-
tions are considered fixed and the buy is assumed to
allow total flexibility for change.
In the opinion of the author, this model is seriously defi-
cient because of these shortcomings and this chapter will
address each area of deficiency, individually.
A- FAULTY ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE NAVY'S LEASE/BUY MODEL
In the author's opinion, although the Navy's lease
versus buy decision model follows the general guidelines set
forth by the GAO, its rationale is predisposed toward the
lease option. This predisposition results from two under-
lying assumptions to the model,
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1- The model assumes that the economic nature of public
sector leasing is the same as that for the private
sector; and
2. The model does not adequately account for the role of
discounting in public sector decisions.
The Navy's model is deficient because of these faulty,
underlying assumptions and the problems these erroneous
bases produce.
The important distinction which the Dinneen model fails
to take into account is that public sector leasing is funda-
mentally different from private sector leasing. In the
private sector, leasing is used simply as a method of
reducing the costs of financing an asset [ Eef . 8: p. 132].
This reduction in financing costs is achieved by the lessee
"trading" the depreciation on an. asset to another entity
(the lessor) whose tax benefits from the depreciation are
greater than those accruing to the asset user (the lessee)
.
In exchange for this "trade," the lessor passes on its
savings to the lessee in the form of lower lease payments.
[Eef. 11: pp. 32-34] The crucial difference from the
lessee's point of view is that the effective interest rate
on the lease is less than that which could be obtained from
its best conventional debt alternative [ Ref . 32: p. 4].
The question which emerges in any public sector lease/
buy decision analysis is, do these lease savings accrue to
the Government in public sector leasing arrangements, as
well? Simply stated, the answer is no [Ref. 32: p, 9].
Capital leasing is basically a private sector device.
It is a method used by private firms to reduce the costs of
borrowed funds. However, the Government's interest payments
do not correspond to their private sector counterparts.
They are more like transfers between individuals in the
private sector since they are taxation dollars, primarily,
received from individuals within the private sector being
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paid to private sector financing institutions via the
Government as intermediary- Unlike a private sector firm
whose revenue represents earnings which will be used in
various ways to create more revenue or be distributed to its
shareholders, the Government's revenues represent funds
which come from the people and will, through an intricate
decision process, be spent and consumed by all or a signifi-
cant portion of the people, all in the name of the "common
good." [Ref. 22: pp. 3-5] It is not clear that reduced
interest rates which accrue to a private sector lessee have
any meaning in the public sector- And, in fact, minimizing
Government interest payments by leasing is unlikely to save
any significant amount of resources. [Ref- 32: p- 11]
There is a valid argument to be made, however, that
leasing does act to reduce an Agency' s budget outlays by
minimizing its interest payments [Ref- I: pp. 5-6].
Therefore, the costs to the Navy of a leased MILSATCOH
system may, in fact, be less than the costs of procuring
that same system because these costs exclude the tax impli-
cations of the lease on the whole of the Government. In
other words, leasing may well look to be the preferred
alternative from the vantage of the Agency, in this case the
Navy, because that Agency's budgetary outlay is lessened.
However, when tax implications and the costs of leasing to
the w ho le Government are considered, leasing does not then
look to be the preferred alternative for acquiring MILSATCOM
systems. Therefore, the entire lease versus buy question
hinges on which perspective one takes--that of the Agency
which strives to keep its particular costs down or that of
the whole Government which strives equally to keep its
overall costs down. It is the author's opinion that the
real costs of leasing to the whole Government must be the
criterion used when considering lease versus buy decisions
not only by 'the Navy but other federal agencies, as well.
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Likewise, in the opinion of the author, the Dinneen
model fails to focus on the r eal resource costs involved in
acquiring communications capabilities. In fact, the acqui-
sition of such capabilities whether leased or bought
requires the same amount of resource consumption. The
diversion of real resources away from the private sector and
to the public sector is the same in either case. Leasing of
MILSATCOM systems does not, in any way, reduce the amount of
private output which must be sacrificed to produce and
acquire MILSATCOM services.
In fact, if one looks at the total costs of procurement
versus leasing to the Government, leasing tends to increase
costs. "The incremental costs of transferring resources
through the established mechanisms of taxation and direct
debt are fairly low while the resource costs of transferring
resources via leasing appear to be quite high," [fief. 32:
pp. 11-12]. In other words, transferring resources frojc the
private to the public sectors through a leasing arrangement
consumes a significant volume of resources. Thus, for this
reason alone, long-term capital leasing should usually be
avoided because it is a less efficient means of accom-
plishing the Navy's mission. £Bef. 32: p. 12]
If this is the case, however, how is it that leasing
has, at times, been found through lease versus buy evalua-
tions to be the more cost effective alternative? Why is it
that leasing, which actually consumes more resources than
does a purchase, oftentimes results in a lower discounted
dollar cost than does the purchase? The simple explanation
is that most lease/buy models and evaluations use a discount
rate [fief. 32: p. 12]. The discount rate is an input chosen
by the decision maker and is representative of the opportu-
nity cost over time of real resources in the private sector
£fief. 22: pp. 161-167]. The discount rate used in decision
analyses is chosen by the decision maker based on the best
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information available at the time. Because in most
Government projects, the relevant financial or budget flows
occur at approximately the same time as the resource flows,
no ambiguity arises when the decision maker uses the
discount rate on the financial or budget flows. However,
when the resource and budget flows occur at significantly
different points in time, as is the case with leasing
arrangements, the use of the discount rate on actual dollar
flows renders misleading results. The fact that the
discounted value of the lease payments is less than the
discounted dollar purchase costs, therefore, has little or
no meaning. [Ref. 32: p- 12] Also, any time the discount
rate exceeds the effective lease finance rate, borrowing
will appear to have a negative cost and leasing will lock to
be the more attractive alternative [Ref. 32: p. 10].
In the author 1 s opinion, what this means to an analysis
of the Navy's lease versus buy decision model is that the
model's underlying premise is exposed as unfounded and unte-
nable. There is no circumstance, in fact, whereby a leasing
arrangement is less costly to the Government than is a
purchase, for the real cost to the economy measured in
resources consumed is the same in both cases. Therefore, a
leased MILSAT30M system represents the same dollar value as
a purchased system plus the flow of dollars and resources
used in arranging the lease. Table III [Ref. 32: p. 13]
clearly shows that when real cost to the economy is consid-
ered, the discounted cost of the buy option will always be
less than that of the lease.
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TABLE III
The Seal Lease versus Buy Problem
BOY LEASE
1) Determine the flow of 1) Since the lease option
dollar payments in a involves the same real
straight buy resource flow as does
the bay. disregard the
dollar lease payments
and substitute, instead,
the flow of dollar
payments in the buy
3BUY $Bay
2) No additional input 2) Add the flow of resources
used in arranging the
lease
$BOY + ZERO = $BDY $BOY + LEASE ARRANGEMENT
3) Calculate the present 3) Calculate the present
discounted value discounted value
4) Compare and choose
the lesser value
B. FACTORS WHICH ARE HOT ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED
There are also elements of the MILSATCOM systems deci-
sion problem which, in the opinion of the author, are inade-
quately addressed by the Dinneen model. These issues
derive, primarily, from the unique mission requirements of
such systems. Although not readily quantifiable, these
issues can be entered into a decision model by using such
methods as a Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) criterion or
Figure of Merit [Ref. 33: pp. 223-227]. However, these
methods for consideration of these factors are not included
in the Dinneen model whatsoever.
Because MILSATCOM systems are required not only to
provide command and control to forces through communications
capabilities in peacetime, but also during and after natural
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disasters, national emergencies, conventional war and global
nuclear war, there are certain long-term system objectives
which tend never to be satisfactorily achieved- Such
HILSATCOM system goals are survivability, including the
robustness and redundancy of systems, and interoperability.
[Ref. 21: pp. 16-17] These factors must be considered in any
decision involving the acquisition of public sector satel-
lite communications systems and the lease versus buy anal-
ysis is no exception.
1 . Survivability
The issue of survivability can be separated into two
distinct elements: (1) physical survivability and (2)
signal survivability. According to Donald C. Latham, Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for C3I (Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence), "Today's communications
systems exhibit significant shortcomings in survivability
and endurance, as well as capacity, connectivity and signal
covertness," [Ref. 3U: p. 46].
First, physical survivability includes not only the
issue of spacecraft survivability but also the survival of
the ground-based, terrestrial element of the cominumnica tions
system.
a. Physical Survivability of the Space-Based
Element
Survivability of the spacecraft component of
space-based systems requires nuclear hardening against EUP, 3
maneuverability and proliferation of spacecraft, and a
3 Electromagnetic pulse, EMP, is that phenomenon whicn
occurs at the time of a nuclear burst whereby the intensity
of the nuclear pulse renders electronics and electro-
mechanical devices, especially solid-state electronics,
inoperative. In the case of space-based systems, EMP bursts
become a tactic used to incapacitate the enemy's command and
control systems. [Ref. 21: p. 10]
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shootback capability, i.e. the ability of a spacecraft to
defend itself against attack. [Ref. 16: p. 10]
The immediate concern in the area of spacecraft
survivability is development of nuclear hardened integrated
circuits, memories, and processors needed to obviate the
effects of EMP. According to studies conducted in the
1970s, integrated circuits are a billion times more likely
to be destroyed by EMP than are vacuum tubes, [Ref. 34: p.
53] Although systems are more and more being hardened
against EMP, nuclear hardening to satisfy the requirements
set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) greatly
increases system costs and weight and concomitantly
decreases system capacity. It is estimated that a full ten
percent of base satellite system cost is required to provide
JCS standards of nuclear hardening. [Ref. 16: p. 11]
In addition, maneuverability and shootback must
also be sought as the Soviet Union has successfully demon-
strated its ability to rendezvous and kill target satellites
with its anti- satellite (ASAT) [Ref. 16: p. 11]. To counter
this known threat, future satellites must either hold the
capability to maneuver rapidly enough to avoid the path of
the ASAT (maneuverability) or be able to defend themselves
against such an attack (shootback) [Ref. 16: p. 11].
b. Ground Component Physical Security
Besides the spacecraft survivability question,
there is the additional requirement for physical security of
the terrestrial component of MILSATCOM systems. In fact, it
may well be in the ground component that the greatest
vulnerability to physical security exists [Ref. 35: p. 24].
An extensive ground-based network is required to provide the
following support functions to the space-based system
[Ref. 35: p. 23] :
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1. Detecting, isolating and correcting, to some extent,
satellite faults. Engineers on the ground analyze
the fault indications received from the satellite and
determine appropriate corrective commands to uplink
to the satellite.
2. Performing routine maintenance functions. These
functions may include anything from managing the
power system to performing maneuvers.
3. Calculating satellite orbital parameters. These
parameters are used to maneuver the satellite to
maintain proper position and to determine satellite
field of view.
4. Generating sequences of commands for real time
mission performance, e.cj. switching tape recorders
on or moving sensors to view different areas of the
earth.
without the ground-based portion of the MILSATCOK system,
the service and performance of the system soon deteriorates
[Ref. 35: p. 23].
Earth terminals and Tracking, Telemetry and
Control (TT&C) stations are vulnerable not only to direct,
military attack but also to sabotage, natural disasters and
the political whims of other countries in the case of ground
stations located outside the United States [Ref. 16: pp.
10-11]. Because of the criticalness of the ground compo-
nent, its control and physical security must be maintained
to ensure the continued availability of MILSATCOM system
services under even the most severe circumstances [Ref. 35].
c. Signal Survivability
The second element of the survivability question
is signal survivability. Signal integrity is imperative to
ensure a reliable and effective command and control system
in all environments. The primary tactical communications
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requirement is for survivable, jam-resistant systems trans-
mitting with a low probability of interception [fief. 36: p.
30].
Satellite repeaters offer interesting targets
for jammers, however, because of the large number of signals
they handle. A jamming signal can swamp the traffic signals
and render a satellite useless. From a geographical point
of view, the jamming of a satellite is rather easy because
of the visibility of the target over a large area. There
are several techniques for overcoming jamming including the
use of null-steering by phased-array antennas,* frequency
hopping 5 and time hopping. 6 [Ref. 36: p. 30] These anti-
jamming techniques when incorporated into MILSATCOM systems
increase the costs greatly [ Eef . 16: p. 10].
2 . Interoperabi lit y
Another factor to be considered in the MILSATCOM
system decision problem is the requirement for interoper-
ability and integration of systems. As an area of major
concern, interoperability includes the need for compati-
bility not only within C2 systems of a single service, but
also between services and among the systems belonging to the
forces of friendly nations, as well. The goal of interoper-
ability among systems does not always result in the achieve-
ment of the capability in the original design of a system.
But it is always a goal to be allowed for in the future and,
*In null-steering, the signals received by the antennas
are processed dynamically and individual phase shifts are
adjusted to maintain a high gain in the direction of the
signal [Eef. 36: p. 30].
5Frequency hopping is transmission at many different
frequencies per second. The hopping speed must be fast
enough to avoid jamming, yet not so fast that equipment cost
becomes excessive [Ref. 36: p. 30].
6 Time hopping represents the most technically advanced
means, and. therefore, most costly means of anti-jamming to
date. it is a technically demanding technique which
requires high-speed switching logic [Ref. 36: p. 30].
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therefore, considered in the decision process. [Eef- 36: p.
30]
3. These Factors and the Lease/Buy Methodology
But what does all this have to do with the lease/buy
evaluation, and what impact does it have on the Navy's lease
versus buy decision model? Again, these factors which
affect the MILSATCOM systems decision process center around
the unique requirements which are placed on such systems.
These requirements— for survivability and interoperability
—are present regardless of the means of acquisition used.
In most cases, these issues impact equally whether the
MILSATCOM system is to be leased or bought, but they must,
nonetheless, be taken into consideration during the decision
process. Additionally, there is one such aspect which, in
the author's opinion, calls into question the desirability
of leasing as a financing mechanism for MILSATCOM systems
acquisition. The survivability question of the ground-based
segment is the problem area.
The vulnerabilities to earth terminals and Tracking,
Telemetry and Control (TT&C) stations are the same under
both the lease and the buy scenarios. However, the degree
of control over such key variables as manning and staffing,
the geographic location of sites and the maintenance for the
ground-based elements has been much greater with the buy
option in the past. With the lease option, there are
serious legal questions as to whether contracts which
require civilians to work in hostile or potentially hostile
situations are, in fact, enforceable. So, the question of
whether adequate manning will be available during those
times when continued connectivity becomes most crucial are
increased with the lease option. [Ref. 16: pp. 19-20]
Likewise, the geographic location of ground terminals and
TT&C sites is critical to the provision of MILSATCOM
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services. The location of such sites away from highly popu-
lated areas is preferred and achieving mobile TT£C capabili-
ties is especially desirable [ Eef . 35: p. 25].
In the author's opinion, because the lease option
which is addressed in the Navy's lease/buy decision model
tends to lessen the control the military services have over
these critical support elements, it is less attractive as an
economic mechanism in acquiring MILSATCOM system services.
However, part of the problem rests with how the Navy's model
narrowly defines "lease" and "buy."
C. COBPARING APPLES AND ORANGES
A major shortcoming of the Dinneen model, in the
author's opinion, is the narrow definition it assigns to
"lease" and "buy" as financing instruments. At the founda-
tion of the model, leasing is considered to be a financing
mechanism which fixes performance specifications at the time
of contract and then gives the lessor technical and mana-
gerial control of system development and production.
Buying, on the other hand, is assumed to be a financing
mechanism which is based, primarily, on design specifica-
tions, which is ripe for PPBS bickering and cutting, and
which is proned to design changes throughout its development
and production due to DOD managerial and technical control.
In other words, the Navy's model is comparing two distinctly
different products—'the proverbial apples and oranges— and
treating them as if they were the same.
What the model does is compare the lease of a MILSATCOM
system where all inputs and variables are fixed versus the
purchase of a MILSATCOM system where all inputs and
variables are changing or potentially changing. In such a
construction, the latter will almost always look the more
costly. But the truth of the matter is, the formulation of
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the decision problem within the model is faulty- Instead of
a comparison between "Lease A" and "Buy A," the Navy's model
compares "Lease A" with "Buy B." The results, in the
author's opinion, will always be questionable.
In short, one of the model's underlying postulates is
again considered deficient and misleading. There is, in
fact, a whole gamut of choices on the "continuum" between a
simple buy and a simple lease. Neither alternative has
results that cannot be achieved through the other alterna-
tive given a willingness to absorb additional costs or
sacrifice some control. The model's failure to recognize
the variability of choices between different leasing and
different buying mechanisms results in its own ineffectual
output.
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VI. CONC LUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is the author's contention that the Navy's lease
versus buy model for MILSATCOM system decision problems is
incomplete and deficient because:
1. It mistakenly assumes that public sector leasing
behavior can be extrapolated directly from private
sector behavior;
2. It does not adequately represent certain factors in
the MILSATCOM system acquisition process such as
questions of survivability;
3. It compares two distinctly different products yet
treats them as identical; and
4. The model's fundamental presumption that there are
situations in which leasing is more cost effective
than buying is unfounded when the total cost to the
Government is the measure.
For these reasons, the model should no longer be used by the
Navy in assessing its lease/buy MILSATCOM system decisions.
A. LEASING AS THE "BETTER" OPTION REFUTED
As discussed in Chapter III, a 1983 GAO report cited
four factors which GAO found to be significant in the
continued attractiveness of capital leasing to Federal
agencies [ Ref . 25: Appendix 1, p. 1 ].
1. The costs of a project can be spread evenly over a
period of years by use of a leasing instrument.
2. The obligations incurred in a lease represent working
capital funds, or 05M funds, instead of procurement
funds.
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3- The amount of scrutiny from Congress given to
purchases was much greater than that given to leasing
arrangements, and
4. Leasing almost always appears less costly because
part of the total cost shifts from the agency's
budget to the Treasury in the form of reduced tax
revenues.
However, the author takes exception to each of these
points. First, although spreading costs equally over a
period of years appears useful and desirable for the Navy,
its consideration serves to muddle the lease/buy decision
because whether funds are spent one way or another has
nothing to do with the actual lease versus buy evaluation.
There is a tendency in lease/buy analyses to "mix apples
with oranges," to compare a "fixed everything" financing
mechanism (the lease) with a "variable everything" financing
mechanism (the buy) and to entertain factors during this
comparison which have nothing to do with the lease and buy
options. A factor such as the timing of budget outlays
falls into this category. Although the Agency will always
be concerned with such an issue, its consideration should be
kept separate and distinct from the cost effectiveness ques-
tion of leasing versus buying instruments. The decision
problem must be structured in terms of its impact on the
whole of the economy with peculiarities of the political and
bureaucratic system such as the timing of budget outlays
given secondary consideration.
Second, the O&M funds versus procurement funds contro-
versy is a similar such argument in that the issue is
outside the context of the lease versus buy evaluation.
Again, for the Navy, the outlay of O&M funds may well be
preferable, but such a preference has little meaning when
considered from the perspective of the whole economy.
Whether the outlays are O&M or procurement funds, or even
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some other "color" monies, does not alter the fact that they
are expenditures by the Government. The cost to the whole
economy and to the Government is the same in any case.
Third, the amount of scrutiny given to leasing arrange-
ments by Congress has increased dramatically since the GAO
report and especially since the Navy's controversial leasing
of cargo and tanker ships [Ref- 6: pp. 32-34]. In the
author's opinion, capital leasing by the DOD will no longer
go unnoticed by Congress, and, in fact, there have already
been initiatives to ensure Congress is appraised of DOD
leasing arrangements [Ref. 6: p. 156].
Last, and as discussed previously, the lease/buy deci-
sion problem should be made with total cost to the economy
as the measure of cost effectiveness. Again, this is part
of the problem of keeping the lease/buy evaluation process
"pure." The tendency is to adulterate the analysis with
issues which result from the political and bureaucratic
workings of the Federal Government— various Federal agen-
cies, each acting to keep its own costs low even at the
expense of other like agencies; different "pots" of money
which affect agencies differently; Congressional areas of
interest which receive special attention, either of a posi-
tive or a negative sort; the vagaries and machinations of
the PPBS process; and the continuous defining and redefining
of program priorities within the President's budget, within
Congress, within the DOD, and within the Navy. These issues
obfuscate the central guestion of whether a leasing arrange-
ment or a buying arrangement is the more cost effective
means of procuring MILSATCOM systems. Therefore, even
though the lease may appear less costly from the Agency
perspective, the ultimate choice must be based on total cost
to the economy, and not on the more narrow desires of the
Agency.
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B. THE BOY—AT PRESENT AN INCENTIVE TO CHANGE
Another conclusion to which the author has come is that
the present conception of the buy provides, in fact, an
incentive scheme for change within DOD MILSATCOM systems.
Because the buy is touted over the lease as the alternative
which provides greater flexibility and control during the
developmental and production phases, the underlying assump-
tion is that changes are not only desirable but are, in
fact, expected. Such a definition of the buy option goes
beyond a mere capability for making changes and, actually,
provides an incentive for change. Basing a MILSATCOM system
buy on design rather than performance specifications goes a
long way in furthering this incentive to change, as well.
The restrictive lease arrangement which is based on perform-
ance specifications and fixes those specifications at the
time of contract negotiation forces cost consciousness about
changes. The same result could be achieved through a buy if
the buy were likewise predicated on performance rather than
design specifications and the specifications ware fixed to
the time of contract award. Again, the buy alternative,
which is the preferred acquisition alternative because it
represents greater cost efficiency to the economy as a
whole, can incorporate some of the provisions usually used
in a leasing instrument and achieve the same end result.
C. LEASE VERSOS HO CAPABILITY
Despite the foregoing major conclusions, however, there
are certain circumstances under which leasing is a viable
means for acquiring MILSATCOM services. Such circumstances
are those in which the analysis becomes lease versus "have
no capability" rather than lease versus buy. Such was the
case with the GAPFILLER system. In that instance, due to
the failure of the TACSAT I, the Navy was faced with the
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options of leasing a commercial satellite system already
operational or go without satellite supported tactical
communications services for several years while a TACSAT
replacement could be built and deployed. Under the circum-
stances, leasing GAPFILLER from COMSAT General was the
preferred solution.
D. BECOHHEHDATIOHS
The purpose of this thesis has been to analyze the
Navy's current MILSATCOM system lease versus buy decision
model, the Dinneen model, and determine its effectiveness in
thoroughly evaluating the lease/buy question. The conclu-
sions generated by this analysis lead to several
recommendations.
First, because the Dinneen model is formulated on faulty
assumptions that leasing can be a less costly financing
instrument than buying and makes the comparison between
lease and buy based on two distinctly different, products,
the model produces misleading results. Therefore, it is
recommended that the Navy discontinue its use of the model
in assessing its lease versus buy MILSATCOM system
decisions.
It is further recommended that, in future lease/buy
analyses, the Navy consider total costs to the economy. The
Navy should fully recognize that there is no circumstance in
which the total costs of leasing to the whole economy and
Government will be less costly than buying. Also, every
attempt should be made to keep the analysis "pure" from
considerations outside the strict cost comparison of leasing
a particular system and buying that same exact system. By
keeping the analysis unmuddled and "pure," additional
choices become available. For instance, in an effort to
determine the true costs of change, it may be desirable for
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the Navy to lease a MILSATCOM system with the option tc make
changes written into the contract. Such a scheme would
allow decision makers to consider changes based not only on
the resulting additional system capability but also on the
resulting additional cost. The cost of change would be
readily measurable under such an incentive scheme, and this
information would be useful in ascertaining whether the
option to change is truly worth its price tag.
Last, it is recommended that future MILSATCOM system
acquisitions be based on performance rather than design
specifications in order to achieve the greatest amount of
efficiency for the dollars spent. Design specifications
create an unstated but real incentive to change and the true
costs of such changes are often unclear. With performance
specifications, on the other hand, there is no similar
incentive for change and the system manufacturer is able to
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